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NOTE AND COMMENT
citizens as well as legislators has been held to rest upon the doc-
trine that a committee may appoint all outside help or counsel
needed to accomplish its purpose, 4 and to hold differently would
seriously hamper the legislature in handling an important part
of its work, namely interstate cooperation. Moreover, the com-
missions as so composed demonstrate an actual development by
the states, within the framework of their present separation of
powers, toward accomplishing a degree of the executive-legisla-
tive coordination thought desirable by political science theorists.15
R. S. S.
EFFECT OF CIVIL RIGHTS OF PARDON IN FORUM FOR
CRIME COMMITTED IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION
Defendant was convicted of a felony in a federal court. For
this crime he would have served two years in a federal peni-
tentiary, but was released on a federal parole after serving part
of his term. The full period of his sentence having expired, he
was issued a certificate of restoration of the rights of citizenship
by the Kentucky governor, and he thereupon sought nomination
for the position of sheriff in a county in that state. Plaintiffs
contended that by virtue of his conviction he became disqualified
either to vote or hold office under the constitution and laws of
the state' and could not be nominated in the primary election
because of such disqualification, despite the gubernatorial pardon.
Held, that even though the conviction was in the federal court
of a federal crime, the disqualification which resulted, viz., the
14. The court so held in Terrell v. King (1929) 118 Tex. 237, 14 S. W.
(2d) 786, where the legislature directed the payment of expenses of a Tax
Survey Committee, composed of legislators and non-legislators, from its
contingent fund. Held, this was a proper exercise of the committee power
of the legislature. The California court in the principal case uses strong
dictum to the effect that such is the view of that court.
15. For example, section 29 of the Model State Constitution (National
Municipal League (1921)) would provide for a legislative council composed
of seven legislators and the governor.
1. Ky. Const. (1891) §§145, 150. Section 145, part 1, provides: "Persons
convicted in any court of competent jurisdiction of treason, or felony, or
bribery in an election, or of such high misdemeanor as the General Assembly
may declare shall operate as an exclusion from the right of suffrage" shall
not have the right to vote; "but persons hereby excluded may be restored
to their civil rights by executive pardon."
Section 150 provides: " * * * All persons shall be excluded from office
who have been, or shall hereafter be, convicted of a felony, or of such high
misdemeanor as may be proscribed by law, but such disability may be re-
moved by pardon of the governor." These are typical constitutional provi-
sions of the American states. Cf. Mo. Const. (1875) art. VIII, §2.
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right to vote and seek office under the state, was not derived
from the laws of the United States but rested solely on the con-
stitution of Kentucky. The right to vote and hold office in a
state comes from the state and is subject to its regulations and
control. The governor therefore had the power to restore the
citizenship rights of the defendant. Arnett v. Stumbo.2
Research indicates that this is the first case passing on the
point in question.$ It is obvious that the sovereign under which
conviction is had can be the only one to relieve an individual of
the punishments it has imposed. A state governor could not
relieve an individual of a punishment or fine meted out in an-
other state or foreign country.4 This has been extended in some
jurisdictions to prevent a gubernatorial pardon for a municipal
ordinance violation within the state.5 Similarly Presidential par-
doning power is limited to offenses against the United States.
The question then arises whether the denial of the right to vote
and hold office for the commission of a crime is (1) a punish-
ment going with the crime, or (2) a denial of privilege made on
the social consideration that felons are neither capable nor trust-
worthy enough to exercise such privileges. It is generally re-
garded that the latter is the more proper conception.7 Under
this view, a conviction in a sister state or federal jurisdiction
would require a pardon from some source, but perhaps that
source might be a jurisdiction other than the place of conviction,
since such a pardon would not be removing a penalty imposed.
From the very nature of the pardoning power as it developed
historically, however, there is difficulty in getting a pardon in a
jurisdiction other than that in which the individual was con-
victed. Pardons are usually granted by the executive branch of
the punishing sovereignty.8 Where no such pardon has been
granted, it is possible that the forum will not recognize the com-
mission of the wrong in a sister state or federal jurisdiction
as a mar to the capability or trustworthiness of the individual
in exercising civil rights.9 The conviction would be disregarded
2. (Ky. 1941) 153 S. W. (2d) 889.
3. See Note (1941) 135 A. L. R. 1493.
4. 24 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 569.
5. Paris v. Hinton (1909) 132 Ky. 654; Allen v. McGuire (1911) 100
Miss. 781, 57 So. 217; State ex rel. Kansas City v. Renick (1900) 157 Mo.
292, 57 S. W. 713; Shoop v. Commonwealth (1846) 3 Pa. 126.
6. U. S. Const. Art. II, §2.
7. Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon (1939) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 177.
8. Jensen, Christen, The Pardoning Power in the American States (1922)
c. I.
9. State ex rel. v. Du Bose (1890) 88 Tenn. 753, 13 S. W. 1088, where
the court said, in considering the disqualification as a penalty which at-
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just as if it were in a foreign country. 0 Some states, however,
give a special regard to conviction under the federal jurisdiction,
with a resulting loss of state civil rights' 1 A federal conviction
primarily disqualifies a person from holding any office or place
of honor, profit or trust under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. 2 As between the state and federal governments
where there is a jurisdictional intertwining, it would seem that
the state courts could logically and properly regard a conviction
for felony in federal courts as such a mar on the individual as
to warrant suffrage and office holding disqualifications." Further,
on the matter of pardons, some of these states, either by con-
stitutional mandate or judicial decision, recognize the effective-
ness of a federal pardon for federal crime to restore state civil
rights, and some states by statute require a Presidential pardon
as a condition precedent to the restoration of state rights. 4 On
the other hand, gubernatorial pardon is a necessity in some states,
taches to the conviction: "Construing the article as a whole, we conclude
the offense specified is limited by the delegation of authority to punish.
Each state has the exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish offenders within
its territory. To fight a duel, to aid and abet in one, to give or to bear a
challenge in Arkansas, is no offense against the laws of Tennessee." This
same principle of the territorial limitation of a conviction is applied in
cases of federal conviction. In Hildreth v. Heath (1878) 1 Ill. App. 82, it
was held that conviction in a federal court of a Congressional statute viola-
tion creates no disqualification in the state. In State ex rel. Mitchell v.
McDonald (1933) 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508, 86 A. L. R. 290, a plea of
guilty to an indictment of perjury in a federal court was held not to
disqualify an individual under the state provisions. The court followed the
principle that this was a conviction in another jurisdiction. See also Logan
v. U. S. (1892) 144 U. S. 263; Commonwealth v. Green (1822) 17 Mass.
515; In re Ebbs (1908) 150 N. C. 44, 63 S. E. 190, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
892.
12. Brown, The Restoration of Civil and Political Rights by Presidential
Pardon (1940) 34 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 295, 299.
13. Crampton v. O'Mara (1923) 193 Ind. 551, 139 N. F. 360; In re
Comyns (1925) 132 Wash. 391, 232 Pac. 269. For a carefully considered
case, see State ex rel. Olsen v. Langer (1934) 65 N. D. 68, 256 N. W. 377,
887, where the court discusses the state's provision for electoral disquali-
fication: "It seems to us unthinkable in view of the purposes underlying
section 127, * * * and the inter-relationship between the state and the
United States, that an elector who has conmitted the most serious of
offenses-for example, treason, or murder, or robbery-and who has been
convicted therefor in the federal court, should not be disqualified to exer-
cise the elective franchise in North Dakota where the offense was com-
mitted." The court says further concerning the provision: "That purpose
is the protection of the state by denying the privilege of the franchise to
those whose unfitness is evidenced by conviction of felony. This disquali-
fication is not a penalty. It is a mere consequence attendant on, and inci-
dental to, the doing of the felonious act."
14. Brown, supra note 12, at 296. Cowan v. Prowse (1892) 93 Ky. 156,
19 S. W. 407; Jones v. Board of Registrars (1879) 56 Miss. 766; State ex
rel. Cloud v. State Election Board (1934) 169 Okla. 363, 3 P. (2d) 20.
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since the courts deny effect to a Presidential pardon to restore
state citizenship rights lost as a result of federal conviction. 15
Another situation is that of the principal case where there is no
indication of denial of effect to a Presidential pardon, but never-
theless, without considering such a possibility, there is no denial
of the governor's power in that matter.
Pardons may be granted on one of two general assumptions:
(1) That the person was wrongfully convicted and that under
subsequent disclosures his conviction appears to have been a
mistake. The pardon is then an attempt to rectify the mistake
by a return of full citizenship status to the wronged party with
an eye to blotting out the odium of guilt. (2) Without denying
the propriety of the former conviction, the pardon may be an
attempt to restore the privileges of suffrage and office holding
which it is now felt that the individual should again be allowed
to assume. Courts in general fail to bother with the distinction
between a pardon blotting out guilt and a pardon which recog-
nizes rehabilitation.16 If the pardon were of the first type, it
would seem that such a pardon should be recognized anywhere.
Where the pardon is of the second type, it is more properly a
matter of policy in a particular jurisdiction whether an indi-
vidual has truly been rehabilitated. Since the disqualification for
conviction of a crime is a state imposed restriction, the present
ase, in holding that gubernatorial pardon is effective to restore
state civil rights which have been withdrawn by state provision
as a result of conviction in the federal courts, reaches a result
which is in logical harmony with either view. There would be a
question whether the same rule would apply where the office
sought under the state is that of representative from the state
in the national House of Representatives or Senate.
D.A.
15. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Irby (1935) 190 Ark. 786, 81 S. W.
(2d) 419; State v. McIntire (1853) 46 N. C. 1, 59 Arm. Dec. 580; Ridley v.
Sheibrook (1866) 43 Tenn. 569.
16. Weihofen, supra note 7.
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